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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the processes involved in attempting to capture 
the subtlest aspects of nature by the scientific method and argues 
on this basis that nature is fundamentally elusive and may resist 
grasping by the methods of science.  If we wish to come to terms 
with this resistance, then a shift in the direction of taking direct 
experience into account may be necessary for science’s future 
complete development.
---------------------------------------
What is matter and what is mind?  René Descartes regarded these 
entities as being of totally different orders and completely 
separate from each other, although nowadays the conventional view is 
to consider mind function as reducible to the behaviour of matter. 
In this paper I want to propose a new theme in the mind–matter 
problem, with an approach that considers what I shall call the 
elusivity or elusive quality of nature.  The fundamental idea is 
that nature at large is less amenable to being pinned down to a 
precise description than the successes of science to date may seem 
to imply, particularly if we consider science as applying to some 
‘objective reality’ that is independent of the scientist.  Some 
phenomena are more elusive to the methods of ordinary science than 
others, as will be explained in terms of a series of examples in 
what follows.  Mind may be especially elusive and it will be 
suggested in the course of this paper that as far as the phenomena 
of mind go, there is no good reason to suppose that a proper 
description in terms of the usual methods of science can be obtained 
at all. To deal with this situation it may prove necessary to use 
subtler methodologies, such as entering into the subtleties of 
conscious experience directly, as is the way of the mystic or of the 
practitioner of the arts.
To illustrate the concept of elusivity, let us focus on the problem 
of knowing precisely where a given object is located.  The least 
elusive entities are classical macroscopic objects.  The position of 
such an object relative to a given reference frame can be typically 
measured by means of a ruler, or by means of the techniques of the 
surveyor, depending on on the length scales involved (or by more 
advanced methods such as those involving lasers if high accuracy is 
desired).  If, however, the object is moving then the question of 
its position becomes problematic, as in the case of the Zeno 
paradox.  If the velocity is very low then the concept of the 
current position has meaning. However, if the motion is rapid the 
concept of ‘now’ is not well enough defined to make the position 
‘now’ meaningful.  In such a case the concept of the time (coupled 
with the physical apparatus of the clock that gives a measure to 
this variable) becomes necessary in order to be able to determine 
and define the position of the object at particular instant of time 
which is of interest. Defining this elusive quantity (the position) 
requires the use of additional apparatus such as a high-speed 
shutter or light source to ‘freeze’ the position and make it 
definite.
In the microscopic domain, we never determine the position of a 
high-speed fundamental particle at a given moment of absolute time 
at all, but only measure its trajectory.  In the quantum domain, 
elusiveness becomes a fundamental feature of nature since the 
uncertainty principle sets definite limits to our ability (even in 
principle) to determine the position of a particle over a period of 
time of finite duration.  Nature in this regime behaves rather like 
an insect that reponds to our attempts to swat it, utilising a 
determination of just where it will be at the appropriate future 
instant, by changing its position.  This ensures that our prediction 
will be incorrect, with the result that the insect survives our 
attempts to dispose of it.
Arguments can be given (Josephson 1988) that in the real world (i.e. 
the world outside the domain of the scientific laboratory) nature 
may be still more elusive than this.   Detailed analysis and 
discussion of arguments due originally to Niels Bohr would appear to 
show that in general any attempt to discover the essence of a 
naturally occurring system in such detail as to be able to describe 
it within a quantum mechanical framework (viz. by assigning to it a 
wave function or a density matrix) will lead to such an alteration 
of the characteristics of the system under study that it will no 
longer be possible to regard it as being applicable to the original 
system. Again, it may be noted that the phenomenon of deterministic 
chaos (Gleick 1988) points equally to the existence of unavoidable 
limitations to the attempt to pin down nature and say exactly what 
it is.
Thus some aspects of nature are more amenable to the way of present-
day science than are others.  We can start to see mind, in its 
subtler aspects especially, as something which cannot necessarily be 
handled in terms of the kind of methods and descriptions that we are 
used to using in the world of science. Even if it is in fact 
legitimate to equate the workings of the mind with the behaviour of 
the brain, the question of what exactly the brain is will present us 
with grave difficulties, even in principle, if we ask questions 
about it at a sufficiently subtle level.
But these traditional methods of science, at least for the hard 
sciences, take little or no account of conscious experience, which 
is regarded as an epiphenomenon that science does not have to take 
account of at all.  Yet our own experiences are in general less 
elusive to us than are the subtler phenomena of modern science.  It 
may thus be argued that if we are to understand the mind fully then 
science needs to take fuller account of the phenomena of conscious 
experience.  In this respect, conscious experience is usually 
considered to be a subjective affair and thus unsuitable for meeting 
the requirements of science.  I believe this to be a mistaken view 
of the situation.  Artists and mystics have, in some cases, 
described their conscious experiences in great detail, and I see no 
reasons (other than custom and ideology) why these should not be 
taken into account in assembling our world-view.  A closely related 
topic is the question of meaning, which David Bohm has suggested 
(Pylkkäanen 1989) constitutes a fundamental aspect of reality.  
Again, in the arts we find meaning to have dimensions that the 
methods of reasoning employed in science have yet to discover 
(Langer 1957).
I will conclude by suggesting that if we wish to come to terms with 
the resistance that the natural world appears to have to being 
grasped by the methods of science, then a shift in the direction of 
taking into account direct experience may be necessary for the 
future development of science, although this will necessarily entail 
a drastic shift in regard to what it is regarded as being 
appropriate areas of exploration for the scientist.
I am grateful to Prof. S.M. Rosen for discussions of experiential 
knowledge.
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